The administrative reforms of Shaykh 'Ali Khan Zanganeh, grand vizier of Shah Soleyman, represent a significant experiment in Safavid Iran's institutional history. Drawing on extensive expertise in finance, trade, and economic diplomacy, he introduced meaningful changes; yet these reforms did not endure or evolve into stable, impersonal rules. Employing an integrated framework (Weberian patrimonialism, Douglass North's historical institutionalism, and rational choice theory), this article argues that Zanganeh's failure cannot be attributed to "moral decay," royal weakness, or lack of administrative rationality. Rather, it stemmed from the institutional logic of the Safavid patrimonial state—where informal rules, patronage networks, and personalized rent distribution overrode formal mechanisms. The study identifies three structural barriers: the rule-implementation gap (the center's inability to enforce fiscal directives locally); the impenetrable power core (harem, eunuchs, and Qizilbash amirs with informal veto capacity); and the reforms' dependence on the vizier's individual agency, preventing their sedimentation into durable structures. It also demonstrates that Zanganeh's concessionary diplomacy, though a rational short-term response to fiscal constraints, expanded the concession cycle and weakened the state's regulatory capacity in the long run. Ultimately, Zanganeh's failure was not personal but indicative of the late Safavid state's structural limitations in transforming individual-centered reforms into sustainable institutions.